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Resumo: 
 
This note shows in what circumstances output persistence may invert the pattern of the electoral cycle 
when inflation expectations are of the adaptive or rational type and the government preferences are 
quadratic over output and inflation. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Electoral cycles, Output persistence 
 
Classificação JEL:  E23, E32, E52, E61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Some years ago authors have started to pay attention to the consequences 
arising from the fact that real variables, such as unemployment or output, 
exhibit a degree of persistence over time (see, e.g., Jonsson, 1997; Lockwood, 
1997; Svensson, 1997). A particularly interesting consequence of output 
persistence is that it may turn upside down the political business cycle, which, 
in its typical form, is associated with depressions at the beginning of the 
mandate followed by pre-election inflationary expansions. This consequence on 
the pattern of the typical political business cycle is shown to exist by Gärtner 
(1996) who considers a model with adaptive expectations and a linear (in 
output)-quadratic (in inflation) policy objective function. Furthermore, Gärtner 
(1999) gives also some credit to the output persistence hypothesis from an 
empirical point of view. 
 
The linearity of preferences over output is far from being innocuous as it implies 
an independence of policy (e.g. inflation) from expectations (e.g. expected 
inflation), which excludes the dynamics that indeed play a crucial role when 
output persists over time. The objective of this note is thus to show what are the 
consequences of output persistence on the dynamic pattern of the electoral cycle 
(EC, hereafter) by considering a full-quadratic objective function. The results of 
the model show that the EC can assume either the typical pattern or the reverse 
one and that output persistence, in any case, may turn the EC upside down. 
Besides the electoral policy implications, these results are also decisive for the 
empirical detection of an EC.1 As this note also considers both rational and 
adaptive expectations it is also possible to show in which circumstances the 
rational and adaptive expectations solutions coincide. 
 
                                                 
1 This means that it is not possible, in general, to always use the potentially observed pre-
elections expansions as empirical evidence supporting the existence of an opportunistic 
behaviour by the government. Sadly, this mistake seems to persist in the (empirical) 
literature. 
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2. The model 
 
Recently some authors have assumed an extended version of the standard 
aggregate supply curve ( )ettt yy pipiβ −+= , where ty  denotes the level of 
output (measured in logarithms) that deviates from the natural level, y , 
whenever the inflation rate, tpi , deviates from its expected level 
e
tpi , by 
considering  
 ( ) ( )etttt yyy pipiδηη −++−= −11 , (1) 
where η  measures the degree of output persistence.2 When normalizing the 
natural level of output such that 0=y  the aggregate supply curve reduces to: 
 ( )etttt yy pipiαφ −+= −1 . (2) 
 
Concerning the government's objective function, we make the standard 
assumption that the government faces a mandate divided into two periods and 
that the discounted loss, at a rate ρ , results from quadratic deviations of output 
and inflation from their desired values, which are assumed to be 0~ >y  and zero, 
respectively. Therefore, 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( )222221212121 ~~ yyyyL −++−+= λpiρλpi  (3) 
represents the government's loss function, which is to be minimized using 
inflation during the mandate, subject to the structure of the economy given by 
(2). 
                                                 
2 This way of introducing persistence, which results in expression (1), is the most 
common in the literature (see, e.g., Gärtner, 1996; Jonsson, 1997; Lockwood, 1997; 
Svensson, 1997). Svensson (1997) justifies the existence of an autoregressive term on 
the Phillips curve when wage setters set nominal wages one period in advance, 
disregarding non-union workers’ preferences for real wages and employment, and where 
union membership depends on previous unemployment. 
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3. The rational expectations case 
 
The minimization of (3) subject to (2), assuming that [ ]1| −= ttet IE pipi , 
immediately leads to the optimal discretionary policies: 
 ( )( )( )20201 1~~ λαφφρφαλpi +−+−= yyyy   
and 
 ( )022 ~ yy φαλpi −= ,  
which, in turn, result in the output levels 01 yy φ=  and 12 yy φ= . Consequently, 
in general, output will in both periods be either below or above its natural level. 
If output does not persist over time, 0=φ , the constancy of output at the 
natural level is achieved with a constant policy, y~21 αλpipi == . The inexistence 
of a cycle at the output level is also verifiable when 1=φ  but, in this case, 
21 pipi >  given that ( ) 221 1 piλραρpi ++= . 
 
For intermediate degrees of output persistence,0 1φ< < , different kinds of 
policy cycles can be observed. This is the case because 
 ( ) ( )( )yy ~11 2022212 ρλαφλραρφφαλφpipi +−++−=−   
can assume both positive or negative values. Even if yy ~0 =  it is possible to 
observe a typical EC, i.e. 12 pipi > , or an atypical one, i.e. 12 pipi < . In particular, in 
case of 00 =y  a reversion on the typical pattern of the EC is observed as 
y~2 αλpi =  whereas ( )( )φρλααλpi 21 11~ ++= y .  
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4. The adaptive expectations case 
 
Following the adaptive expectations hypothesis, the government minimizes (3) 
subject to (2), where ( ) ee 001 1 piγγpipi −+=  and ( ) ee 112 1 piγγpipi −+= . 
 
We restrain the analysis to the steady-state cycle, that is the situation where 
02 yy = . In this case, it is straightforward to verify that 12 yy −= , i.e. output 
expansions and depressions, of the same magnitude, succeed over time. To put 
it more precisely, the expansion takes place at the end of the mandate – typical 
EC pattern – if 12 pipi >  – or at the beginning of the mandate – atypical EC pattern – 
if 12 pipi < . In fact: 
 
( )
( )( )γφ
pipiα
−+
−
=−=
21
12
12 yy .  
 
The solution to the government’s problem can be written down as p q=A , 
where 
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Simple manipulation of the optimal electoral policies shows that: 
 
( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )φγρλαγφ
αλργφφγ
pipi
−++−+
−+−
=−
221
~21
212
y
. (4) 
Equation (4) shows that what dictates the pattern observed on the EC is simply 
the relationship that exists between the degree of expectations persistence and 
the degree of output persistence. The typical (resp. atypical) EC pattern should be 
observed when φγ >  (resp. φγ < ). 
 
5. An expected result 
 
Plainly, when the degrees of persistence on adaptive expectations and on output 
are such that φγ =  the optimal policies during the mandate coincide, leading to 
the inexistence of a cycle on output, which remains at its natural level. A simple 
inspection of the adaptive expectations solution for this case, i.e. 
y~21 αλpipi == , shows that it indeed coincides with the rational expectations 
solution when, in this case, output does not show persistence over time. In this 
sense, the 0=φ  case when expectations are rational is formally equivalent to 
the φγ =  case when expectations are adaptive. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Our main result is that output persistence may indeed invert the pattern of the 
electoral cycle, which can already be upside down – assuming as a reference the 
typical pattern – given that preferences are quadratic over inflation and output.  
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This result has clear policy implications, not only to the way policy instruments 
should be used to obtain the best electoral outcomes but also at the level of 
competition policies used to diminish persistence. Moreover, in terms of the 
empirical detection of electoral cycles, it seems crucial to understand that the 
observation of a typical pattern of the cycle over the mandate cannot be used in 
an isolated way, i.e. without a test on the level of persistence, as a signal of 
opportunistic behaviour by the incumbent. 
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